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Firstly, I'd like to thank the author and journal editor, Simon Jenkins, for an opportunity to 
comment on his published piece 'Beyond crude pragmatism in sports coaching: Insights from 
C.S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey'. In responding, somewhat in the spirit of the 
original article itself, I allowed myself some pragmatic leeway; some room to drift from 
traditional confines of direct retort, and lightly touch upon some selected concepts mentioned. 
In doing so, rather than opposing the objective of the exercise, I felt I was somewhat 
contributing to it. This was because 'Beyond crude pragmatism' follows a rather loose thread 
of argument itself, meandering from classic pragmatism, to an interpretation of the football 
coach Arsène Wenger's practice, to mixed research methods, to reflection and the work of 
Donald Schön [1], and back again. 
 
The first point which drew attention was the mention given to coaches' philosophies; both 
Cushion and Partington's [2] assertion that coaches struggle to identify what is meant when a 
question regarding their own philosophy is posed, and Huber's [3] assertive definition of a 
philosophy. A coaching philosophy, or rather having one, has traditionally been embedded in 
coaches' learning and coach education as something coaches should have and know; as a 
definitive compass or guide to practice. As a researcher and coach I've increasingly come to 
question both the value of trying to clearly articulate one’s philosophy (or to claim a 
philosophy as one’s own), and what it means to do so. This is because what coaches do and 
really reflect on is practice. Now this is not to say that coaches practice without careful 
consideration to the objectives, progression and consequences of that practice, but that any 
thought regarding it comes not in advance (i.e., ‘I philosophise, therefore, I do’). Rather, such 
consideration is interlinked and unfolds within the practice, and in making retrospective sense 
of that practice. An articulation of any philosophy then, if it is to avoid the proverbial wish-
list, can only come as a justification of practice. This naturally calls into question the 
relevance of getting coaches to articulate their respective ‘philosophies’. Better, in my mind, 
to get them to justify practice, and examine any abstract inference from there. 
 
A second point worthy of musing within the article was that of the so-called 'Pragmatic 
temperament'. Here, I found Burke's [4] nautical metaphor rather ironic. In stating that a 
ship's compass needs to be flexible and to 'move freely on a pivot', yet be subject to the 
independent realities of the world's gravitational and magnetic fields, provides a rather 
obvious contradiction. The argument of 'be flexible when you need to be, but only when you 
need to be' doesn't help anyone too much. Any practitioner or student would be within his or 
her rights to demand more insightful guidance here. If the compass is always obeyed, where's 
the pragmatism in that? While if it is sometimes not, an inevitable question asked would be 
‘what are the conditions and contextual factors that may create such a situation?’ 
Furthermore, as argued elsewhere [5] such situations or events have to be temporally located; 
that is, in an appreciation that there is no present without a past. This, of course, is not to take 
the argument for pragmatic flexibility (defined as a 'flexible attitude of mind' or 'attitude of 
orientation' within Jenkins's paper) to its logical end point; to some kind of anything goes 
relative fudge. It's a position I've tried to clarify in recent work (e.g., [5] & [6]) to counter 
criticism of having portrayed coaching as unmanageable complexity. Perhaps then, this is a 
point to be addressed in future when scholars claim a pragmatic approach; that is, how 
pragmatic is or should be a pragmatic practitioner. Finally here, a rather argumentative 
character intent on finding flaws in the evident philosophic case making (!) may question that 
if the pragmatic approach is adopted across the board, then where's the pragmatism in that? 
Consequently, the case for pragmatism clearly needs some deconstruction, and 
reconstruction. 
 
Having followed, admired and been somewhat frustrated by Arsène Wenger's career at 
Arsenal Football Club, I found the link between his practice and pragmatism interesting to 
say the least. If I were ever asked to name the least pragmatic football coaches I know of, I 
would say, Guardiola and Wenger. Why? Not because of what they say (or have said), but on 
the evidence of what they do. Their teams are very (if not instantly) recognisable in terms of 
how they play; both coaches have certain beliefs about the game and appear quite reluctant to 
abandon them; the antithesis of pragmatism? Hence, the argument made that Wenger was and 
is pragmatic was difficult to understand and follow. Similarly, claiming someone is 
'pragmatic with ideals' again helps little in terms of understanding here. This is not to say that 
structure and contingency can’t exist together; rather that a nuanced exploration of these 
dilemmas and tension is needed to understand better the whys and wherefores, the underlying 
causes and reasons of action. What is required is greater criticality in terms of sense making; 
not to merely accept coaches’ words and actions per se, but to delve, question and query in 
the quest for meaning. Wenger a pragmatist? More of an idealist or purist in my book. 
 
A fourth point worth considering within 'Beyond pragmatism' relates to the case for mixed 
methods as some manifestation of pragmatism in (doing) research (and here I embark on 
some self-critique). Although some would consider it a point of semantics, the authors cited 
in making the case (e.g., [7], of which I was a co-author), although claiming to do so, don't 
really engage in any authentic form of mixed methodological study. For example, in 
following systematic observation with interviewing what we undertook [7] was the use of 
multiple consecutive methods, not mixed or the mixing of methods in the classical sense. 
Why does this matter? It matters as it goes to the core of grounding research in a particular 
ontology and related epistemology (which, in theory, should lead to a particular 
methodology). However, by rather naively following an objective data collection method 
(i.e., systematic observation) with an interpretive, subjective one (i.e., interviews) naturally 
creates an epistemological misalignment. This is not say that counter arguments for mixed 
methodologies exist, but these were not [7], [8] and currently are not being engaged with thus 
diluting the value and quality of the work. Hence, it is an area and issue which requires 
greater critical rigour if it is to be used or claimed within coaching related research. 
 
Although this commentary may appear an overly critical response at first glance, it is not 
meant to be so interpreted. There are plenty of ideas within the original submission from 
Simon which I agree with and have similarly advocated; for example, that of fallibism as an 
idea for coaches to think with, in addition to Dewey's notion of 'future- orientated thinking'. 
Indeed, both notions are currently examined and discussed with students on our newly 
launched Doctorate of Sports Coaching at Cardiff Met where the backwards (reflective) and 
forwards (inferential) nature of coaches’ thinking are de- and re-constructed. Rather, in the 
spirit of generating further debate from this thought provoking piece, I have chosen to focus 
on some concepts which need further examination and comprehension, otherwise they remain 
at the level of the abstract. The general call then is to take care with the phrases and language 
we use in terms of what they more clearly mean (e.g., being pragmatic). To think through to a 
greater degree the observations recorded and the words transcribed in order to extrapolate 
hidden meanings in the discourse; to not just accept, but in the tradition of critical sociology, 
to question the taken for granted and make the familiar strange. Only then can we engage 
with any theory at the level of criticality required, not as decoration but as authentic 
explanatory and guiding concepts. 
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